

Red, White Black and Blue

The Politics of Party and Race in Philadelphia
Seen through the Failings of the City's Republican Party

By Christopher George Wink

Completed May 9, 2008: Updated June 1, 2008, July 7, 2008
thesis.christopherwink.com

Table of Contents

Thesis: Philadelphia hasn't had a Republican mayor since Bernard Samuel left office in 1952, a Democratic record that has few equals in urban politics. There are questions as to whether politics and racial demographics can sustain a two-party system in the city. Can a Republican be elected mayor of Philadelphia?

Thesis: Introduction

PHILADELPHIA IS OLD, ITS STREETS AND BUILDINGS AND, MOST CERTAINLY, ITS POLITICS. IT ALSO IS A CITY OF CONTRADICTION, AS ANY LIFELONG PHILADELPHIA, WHO SHOWS LOVE FOR IT BY DOUBTING IT AND CRITICIZING IT AND LOATHING IT, WILL TELL YOU. So it might be fitting that a young man, one who has spent less than a quarter of his life in this Quaker City and has nothing more than interest and an undergraduate degree from its largest university, should undergo a year long appraisal of its political status.

Just as Philadelphians can look wistfully back on its time as the "Workshop of the World" or the publishing capital of the country, so, too, can Republicans admire a time long since gone. After all, the GOP enjoyed more than a century of nearly uninterrupted rule over Philadelphia. As Lincoln Steffens put it in his famously, over-cited indictment of the city in 1905, "Philadelphia is corrupt and contented." But, more acutely, it was the city's Republicans who were contented.

Little more than fifty years later and the Republican Party's hold was broken by legends of the city's progressive movement who led an effective charge that began six decades of solid Democratic rule. Nothing was ever the same.

The situation: *'I don't believe, frankly, that a Republican can win'*

"One of the really bad things that's happened to this city is the demise of the Republican Party," former city managing director Phil Goldsmith, now a management consultant, told me in a recent interview. "Because it eliminates competition."

Beyond the mayoralty, Philadelphia hasn't elected a Republican to any major citywide office since 1989, when Ron Castille was reelected district attorney. Even still, two years later he was very nearly run out of town by Democratic Mayor turned Republican mayoral candidate Frank Rizzo, who labeled Castille a "drunk" during their 1991 Republican mayoral primary, not long before Rizzo died of a massive heart attack.

There is fun yet to be had in Philadelphia, indeed.

Before Philadelphia's most recent mayoral Election Day, during which Democrat Michael Nutter would amass more than 82 percent of the vote, a former GOP mayoral nominee thought the outlook bleak.

"I don't believe, frankly, that a Republican can win," Sam Katz, who lost in 1999 and 2003 - and came in a distant third in the 1991 primary - told the *Philadelphia Inquirer* last fall. He is still trying to repay his 2003 campaign debt, despite the nearly \$11 million that flowed into his campaign coffers to thwart eventual victor John F. Street, now a Temple University adjunct faculty member.

Al Taubenberger, Nutter's Republican opponent - no Sam Katz, by most accounts - toiled along nonetheless.

"There's no Republican or Democratic way to collect the trash," Taubenberger told the *Inquirer* during the election.

Of the more than 1 million registered voters in Philadelphia, nearly 800,000 registered Democrats not only seem to think he's wrong, but the roughly quarter million who voted against him don't think Taubenberger should be collecting their trash at all. His plight is just the latest in a long half century of Republican defeats in Philadelphia.

An outline of this paper

"This is the cradle of democracy," said a Republican supporter who is trying to organize her neighbors in Fishtown. "But Democracy has been dead in Philadelphia for a long time."

True, the GOP bargains for crumbs in many cities, but few places are as hostile to Republicans as the Cradle of Liberty. Is that a Republican failing or a Democratic success? Is it even reasonable to entertain a conversation about Philadelphia hosting a viable two party system or is that a dream of the past?

What follows is an exhaustive study pursuing those answers for one of the most dynamic, interesting and under-studied political environments in the country. In the past half year, I have spoken with more than 20 politicians, academics and journalists who have devoted their lives, their minds and often their reputations to Philadelphia. Sometimes it was for an hour, often it was more, regularly we came upon smiles, on occasion we traversed ideological and generational lines, but always, we determined a sustainable and competitive Republican Party is the healthiest cure for pay-to-play politics, corruption and inefficiency.

My research has determined that Republicans can find success with a socially liberal candidate, a vulnerable Democratic administration, a balanced racial element and a subdued national political climate.

This paper is broken into five sections: part one, diagnosing the present; part two, reviewing the past; part three, comparisons with successful urban Republican parties, and part four, focuses on how this city differs. Finally, one the back of eight months of research and 25 hours of interviews, part five features findings and conclusions about the Republican Party in Philadelphia.

Part One: THE PRESENT

A Diagnosis: *What's Wrong with Philadelphia Republicans?*

AL TAUBENBERGER IS, BY ALL ACCOUNTS, A FRIENDLY MAN, ADORNED WITH SILVERY WHITE HAIR PARTED NEATLY AND PURPOSEFULLY. HE, TOO, IS NEAT AND PURPOSEFUL. Taubenberger wanted to be mayor of Philadelphia - his hometown - but, of course, he will never be mayor of Philadelphia, hometown or not.

In June 2007, Taubenberger told the *Philadelphia Inquirer* that, on a scale of one to ten, his chances of victory in the November general election were around three and a half (Gelbert 2007). Most might agree he was being fairly generous. After all, Taubenberger is a Republican, a distinction that hasn't been an asset in more than half a century.

Philadelphia, one of the largest and most historic cities in the United States, hasn't seen a Republican win a mayoral election since 1947, just two years after the close of the Second World War.

Some question whether Taubenberger - a virtual unknown beyond his role as chairman of the obscure Greater Northeast Philadelphia Chamber of Commerce - was the best candidate the Republicans could support. The current Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives Dennis O'Brien, former Speaker John Perzel, Tenth District Councilman Brian J. O'Neill, and at-large Councilmen Jack Kelly and Frank Rizzo, Jr. all had better name recognition on which to build and, for sure, thicker legislative resumes - considering Taubenberger had never served in an elected office before.

In past elections, the Republican Party has supported a former Democrat as their mayoral choice, including Sam Katz in 1999 and 2003 and former Democratic mayor Frank Rizzo, who won the Republican mayoral primary in 1991 before dying of a heart attack. So perhaps U.S. Sen. Arlen Specter's attempts at courting Democratic mayoral hopeful and powerful state Rep. Dwight Evans or businessman Tom Knox, another who also vied for the Democratic mayoral bid should have been expanded (Davies 2007).

Lessons from the 2007 Mayoral Election: *'I was projected to get eight percent...'*

"By 2007, the Republican Party has become the weakest in my memory. They can't win against anybody," said former Democratic Mayor John F. Street. "They were never serious

about recruiting a candidate. They led their candidate [in 2007] to slaughter. I don't think it's good for the city."

Since November 1947, eight Democrats have won 14 by an average of more than 100,000 votes. Perhaps for that reason, when Michael Nutter won Philadelphia's Democratic mayoral primary in May 2007, he was heralded as the heir apparent to Room 125 in Philadelphia's historic City Hall. Seven months later, in anticlimactic fashion, that became a reality.

Al Taubenberger would not be Philadelphia's mayor, not that anyone ever thought he would be.

"I didn't realize he was the candidate," said Eric Mayes, a political reporter for the *Philadelphia Tribune*, the oldest traditionally black newspaper in the country. "I thought he was just a man in a suit."

Nutter, a more distinguishable man in a suit, grabbed nearly 83 percent of the vote, 223,000 to Taubenberger's 46,000 (WHYY 2007). In a city where nearly 80 percent of registered voters are with the Democratic Party, the results came as little surprise. Indeed, if there was any surprise at all on Election night, *KYW News Radio* reported that it came from Northeast Philadelphia, the de facto base of the city's Republican Party, and even that surprise was how well the candidate no one took seriously did (Dunn 2007).

"I was projected to get eight percent," Taubenberger was reported by *KYW* as having told his supporters. "I'm over 18 percent, and I think it's going to be a little higher yet."

At the end, the Taubenberger camp claimed little more than 17 percent of 270,000 votes (WHYY 2007).

"Al Taubenberger fell on the sword for the party, but he did it for the city," said Randall Miller, a professor of history at St. Joseph's University who teaches courses in urban politics. "I think the Republicans failed him."

The central questions are how did the Republicans fail Taubenberger, how have they failed the city, and whether it is even reasonable to believe Philadelphia can sustain a healthy, competitive two-party system.

The rise of today's Republican leadership: *'Meehan, in time, won, but soon the Republicans lost.'*

Michael Meehan is a large man, in body and in name. He is often cited as the last of the big city party bosses, not an elected official himself, but rather general counsel to the Philadelphia Republican City Committee. Meehan's father Bill filled the role until he died, in 1994. Meehan's grandfather Austin did the same.

Between the 1860s to the 1950s, Philadelphia had just three Democratic mayors. Just an additional one more Democrat - Richard Vaux - captured City Hall after Feb. 2, 1854 - a seminal, modernizing moment in the city's political history, when an act passed the Pennsylvania State Assembly that consolidated Philadelphia city and county into a single political and geographical unit among other city charter alterations (Mayoral Election Totals).

Then in November 1951, Democrat Joseph S. Clark, Jr. broke through, beating Republican Daniel A. Poling by 120,000 votes. Philadelphia hasn't had a Republican mayor since.

So it seems there was an enormous shift from a Republican machine to a Democratic one.

"In 1938, no one thought a Democrat would ever win in Philadelphia again," Goldsmith, the former city managing director said.

But there was more involved.

"There was no Republican machine. There were five machines," said Fred Voigt, a former executive director of political oversight group the *Committee of Seventy*. "Like the Vare brothers in South Philly, the Hawthorne brothers in Roxborough, and Austin Meehan in the Northeast. They were only united by protectionism for high tariffs like the national Republican Party, so they battled for power. Meehan, in time, won, but soon the Republicans lost."

Understanding Philadelphia Republicans: *'They're stuck in the Northeast and scared to come out.'*

The city's Republican Committee fills a modest lower level of room in the Windsor Suites on the Benjamin Franklin Parkway, but no one who knows much of anything about Philadelphia politics is fooled. The GOP's Philadelphia successes have been almost exclusively based in Northeast Philadelphia, a suburban enclave that is still primarily white. The city's three There are pockets of city employees and bureaucrats who depend.

"The Republicans have become a regional party," said Tom Ferrick, a lifelong Philadelphian and celebrated columnist for the *Inquirer*. "They're stuck in the Northeast and scared to come out."

Still, as Meehan is quick to point out, there are more than 140,000 Republicans registered in Philadelphia, the largest county total in the Commonwealth, he said. Those Republicans comprise one segment of of a purposefully over-simplified division of the city's voters that can help us better understand voting patterns in Philadelphia. There are at least three others, including: the white, working class; educated, liberal progressives, and remaining black voters. All can certainly and naturally be further divided into yet smaller and more determinable groups, but these four broad-based categories can be valuable in evaluating the possibility of citywide Republican victory.

Registered Republicans: *All registered party members, mostly based in the Northeast. Few are likely ideologically based, but, rather, may use what is left of patronage to gain employment. May be employed in city agencies run by GOP, like the Parking and Convention Center authorities.*

Ethnic Democrats: *Working class, largely white trade members, unionized labor, and city employees like police officers and firefighters. Many based in South Philadelphia and river wards*

Liberal progressives: *Educated and established families in Chestnut and Society Hills, growing affluent populations in Center City, and reform-minded voters pocketed in these and other gentrifying communities throughout northwest, South and West Philadelphia.*

Black voters: *Broader socioeconomic groups in North, West, lower northwest and lower Northeast Philadelphia, often more socially conservative and religious but least likely group*

to vote Republican

Philadelphia isn't without Republicans of note. The city is, after all, the largest in Pennsylvania, a Commonwealth with a rich conservative history. But, as suggested earlier, current state House Speaker O'Brien, his predecessor Perzel and other state Reps. Kenney and Taylor are limited in their reach.

"They have never had wider ambition to do more. What they have done, they've done it in Harrisburg," said Dave Davies, who has been the senior political writer at the *Philadelphia Daily News* since 1990. "Recruitment: that's where I fault the Meehans."

Because Kenney and Taylor - the newest state Republican presence from Philadelphia - both first went to Harrisburg in 1984. It also comes as no surprise that all four are from the Northeast, like 10th district City Councilman O'Neill and at-large Councilmen Rizzo Jr. and Kelly.

"The fact is that Frank Rizzo gets elected because his name is Frank Rizzo. Jack Kelly gets elected because his name is Jack Kelly. Kenney's retiring. Perzel took a blow. How many more times will Brian [O'Neill] retain his seat [on City Council]?" said Katz, the former Republican mayoral contender. "Look, they're getting older, and no one is there to keep the fight going."

What more, the Republican presence the city does have may not be representative of how little GOP activity there is.

Of 17 City Council members, three are Republican. Of three City Commissioners, who recommend policy to Council and act as liaisons with residents, one - Joe Duda - is Republican. But even those positions come with the city's municipal charter, which effectively guarantees bipartisan in Council and Commissioner offices. Article two, section two, clause 101 in the Philadelphia Home Rule Charter reads as it follows:

At the municipal election held in 1951, and in every fourth year thereafter, one councilman shall be elected from each councilmanic district and seven from the City at large. Each elector shall have the right to vote for one district councilman and for five councilmen-at-large. **To this end not more than five candidates for councilmen-at-large shall be nominated pursuant to law by any party or other political body.***(Emphasis added)*

Should a vacancy occur in the office of any councilman, the President of the Council shall issue a writ of election to the board of elections having jurisdiction over elections in the City for a special election to fill the vacancy for the balance of the unexpired term, which election shall be held on a date specified in the writ, but not less than thirty days after its issuance. The President of Council may fix as the date of the special election, the date of the next primary, municipal or general election.

"There is a structural problem to Philadelphia," said Miller, the St. Joseph's professor said. "The city charter guarantees the minority party at least two council seats. So, a party can become lazy. The Republicans are guaranteed a ticket on the ballot, unlike a third party candidate."

So, while in vying for for the seven at-large City Council bids in the November 2007 election just one Republican managed even half of the lowest Democrat total - Rizzo's 7.4 percent to Blondell Reynolds Brown's 14.3 percent - two, Rizzo and Kelly, were reelected as at-large members (WHYY 2007).

The city GOP committee isn't motivated to reach out to the other three groups of Philadelphia voters: working class union members, reform-minded progressives or blacks. Instead, guaranteed representation assures they will have a small number of city jobs and contracts to , in-power Republicans can depend on the relatively small number of registered party members.

"Northeast Republicans are keeping it a patronage game," said Goldsmith, the former managing director.

Still, some do debate Miller's take on the clause's merit.

"If anything, guaranteed representation has slowed down the inevitable elimination of the party," said Voigt, the former longtime executive director of Philadelphia's century-old political oversight group.

The only pure victory the Republicans had in a city election in 2007 was Brian O'Neill, City Council's minority leader, capturing an eighth term representing Philadelphia's tenth councilmanic district in the far Northeast. Even still, O'Neill's competition - Sean McAleer - won 42 percent of the vote against the entrenched incumbent (Committee of Seventy). As Katz noted, demographics and time are plotting against the aging councilman.

The Republican lineage: *'The Meehans have always wanted to win when they can.'*

The Philadelphia Republican City Committee is chaired by Vito F. Canuso Jr., but most seem to agree that Meehan, from one of the oldest political families in the city, runs the show.

In 2007, the lawyer moved from Reed Smith to Wolf Block Schorr & Solis-Cohen as counsel of its real estate group. The primary reason for his move was his interest in local issues, to benefit from Wolf Block's clients like the Philadelphia Parking Authority and the Regional Port Authority, he said. He has a fine office on the 22nd floor with a window for a wall that overlooks much of the city.

He is friendly with ruddy cheeks and a broad smile. He has a practiced air of innocence and seems at least occasionally paranoid. He is a politician. He is leading over a dying brand. He is the great question in the puzzle of the city's Republican Party.

"I think one myth that has been out there for a long time is that the Meehan family is fine with losing," said Davies of the *Daily News*. "That just isn't true...the Meehans have always wanted to win when they can."

One doesn't need Meehan's permission to run, of course. But understanding why his approval so often coincides with the party's endorsement is a lesson in the type of machine politics that has been dying for decades.

The blessing of the Republican city committee comes with a guaranteed spot on the ballot and the avoidance of the far more competitive Democratic field. In the small pond of the Republican Party, Meehan has influence over some city jobs, which keeps some registered with the party and in good graces with him. This means, of course, that Meehan has some ability to sway votes - though how much is debated and certainly thought to be lessening with time. So, naturally, city ward leaders and committeemen, who have direct access to and natural influence over voters, rarely deviate from Meehan's endorsements, particularly considering that some of these lesser party leaders themselves benefit from the general

counsel's minor largess.

The process can be briefly encapsulated thusly: the Republican Party selection committee - which Meehan leads - chooses a candidate and the city's 66 ward leaders - one of whom is Meehan, in the 65th ward - ratify that decision. Meehan's control over the committee and influence over many of the ward leaders makes him as powerful as an unelected Republican can be in Philadelphia (Infield 1998).

This is machine politics in historic viability.

This is machine politics, the likes of which have mostly been buried, the obituaries written and memory evoked. In the 2006, 5th edition of their text *City Politics: the Political Economy of Urban America*, Dennis R. Judd of the University of Illinois at Chicago and Todd Swanstrom of St. Louis University did just that (Judd 66).

The urban machines that endured beyond the 1920s relied heavily on relationships forged with national politicians and federal aid for their survival. After the New Deal, many machines skillfully used federal programs to expand their resource base. But those days have passed. After the late 1970s, the federal government sharply cut grants to cities. In addition, the exodus of industry and the middle class to the suburbs have deprived the cities of critical tax sources and borrowing power. The largest public projects are now administered through special authorities that are separate from municipal government...

They continue.

It would be extremely difficult for today's politicians to assemble the patronage and other material rewards necessary to build and maintain machine organizations. City services are now administered through civil services bureaucracies, and merit employment systems have been put in place so patronage can no longer be regularly delivered on the basis of personal or political relationships.

"What we have is Meehan using 19th century politics in a 21st century world," said Kevin Kelly, a former leader of Philadelphia's Young Republicans who is trying to energize the party, as I saw during a Thursday night meeting in the conference room of the Fishtown office of his design firm Silica.

One of the most cited examples of recent patronage in Philadelphia is the city's Parking Authority. In mid-2001, Perzel, then Speaker of the state's House, led a Republican takeover of the city's agency, saying it had become corrupt and bloated by its Democratic leadership.

"The machine is still so strong here," said Mayes, the political reporter for the *Tribune*. "But machine politics aren't supposed to exist anymore."

Some say they shouldn't.

"I think Rep. Perzel has done a terrible job," said former Democratic Mayor Street. "The Parking Authority just didn't work. The bureaucracy has tripled in the PPA, in the Convention Center Authority. Partisan political activity didn't work."

Yet, for the Republicans it might be all that is sustaining a party that is largely broken, as displayed by the parking authority's development of a red-light camera program, according

to a report by the *Philadelphia Daily News* (Warner 2008).

Although the installation, equipment, ticketing and collections for the red-light program are handled by outside contractors, the Parking Authority has established a red-light unit with five employees. It's run by a Republican ward leader, Christopher Vogler, who has two GOP committeemen among his four staff members.

Skeptics remain.

"I reward results," Kelly said. "If you were zero for the last 50 years in any other job in the world, would you still have that job?"

The many parties of the city: 'Philadelphia Democrats are like the B'ath Party in Iraq'

Nearly 60 years of mayoral and City Council control can be viewed in two broad ways, either a Republican failure or a Democratic success. One put squarely in the hands of Meehan and his family, and the latter a victory for U.S. Congressman Bob Brady, the former union carpenter who led the city's Democratic Party since 1986, and his predecessors.

Much like the notion of a single, unified ruling Republican Party in the first half of the 20th century, it may be misguided to think of a single Democratic Party rules today.

"Bobby Brady rules over this flea market anarchy," said Voigt, Seventy's former executive director. "The idea that there is this monolith is inaccurate."

The 2007 Democratic mayoral primary is a singular example. Michael Nutter ran to City Hall as the reform candidate, a Democratic 52nd ward leader since 1990 and a 15-year veteran of City Council.

"I think everyone agrees that Philadelphians are ready for a change," said Mayes, the *Tribune* writer. "But Michael Nutter is still a Democrat."

A reform candidate within the party that has ruled for more than a half century.

"Philadelphia Democrats are like the B'ath Party in Iraq," said Brett Mandel, executive director of *Philadelphia Forward*, a nonprofit advocating tax reform in Philadelphia, and a former employee in the city's tax and budget office.

Nutter's Democratic competition included Brady, outgoing Mayor Street's candidate U.S. Congressman Chakah Fattah, powerful state Rep. Dwight Evans, and a self-labeled outsider Tom Knox, among others.

"I think there is more of a two-party system within the Democratic Party here," said Goldsmith, the former city managing director. "There is more change going on now than if Brady or Fattah had gotten in."

Reformers among Brady Democrats: 'I expected Nutter to be a cold and nerdy dude'

In December 2007, then Mayor-elect Michael Nutter wrote an op-ed for the *Inquirer* defending Brady, heralding his in sustaining the city's Democratic Party - a reformer defending the machine.

"Michael Nutter isn't a reformer," Marc D. Collazzo said. Collazzo is active in Kelly's movement to revive the city's Republican Party. The West Chester lawyer was one of a handful of registered Republicans who echoed the same charge at a meeting of Kelly's group in April. Without a Republican voice in the city, though, Nutter can fill that role, Collazzo said. Nutter's reform mantra, though, allows him to court and retain the liberal progressives of Philadelphia and being a black community leader affords him some attraction in those communities, while partnering with Brady - a former union carpenter who never went to college - helps attract ethnic Democrats.

Those who expect two-parties from the Democrats and are led to believe that Nutter and Brady are from two very different camps were therefore surprised at Nutter's defense of Brady. *Inquirer* City Hall reporter Patrick Kerkstra asked Nutter what reforms of the party he wanted (Kerkstra 2007).

Asked what specific reforms he'd like to see, Nutter said the party ought to have an open process for choosing which candidates to support. He also proposed training for would-be candidates, stepped-up recruiting of candidates and committee members, and a guest speaker program. Asked about the shakedown that judicial candidates are subjected to by some ward leaders, Nutter said he'd prefer that judges not be elected. "These are the kinds of issues I intend to have discussions with the chairman about," Nutter said.

It's part of making a reformer out of a party man.

Nutter ran his mayoral campaign against incumbent John Street, even though term limits precluded Street from running at all. But Street was a man who lost portions of the ethnic Democrat and sizable portions of the liberal progressive vote in 1999 to Sam Katz. Street was exactly who Nutter could beat. So he ran commercials and stumped on how he served City Council as a check to Street, reminding voters of the smoking ban legislation he wrote and got passed, though it was suspected Street pressured it not to pass because of their rivalry.

In January 2007, *Philadelphia* magazine featured a story on Nutter, months removed from his leaving City Council in pursuit of the mayor's office. It, too, portrayed Nutter as a reformer and - as a magazine with a city readership that likely includes mostly liberal progressives - made frequent and direct mention of his notably "un-Street style" (Fagan 2007).

From reading the papers, I expected Nutter to be a cold and nerdy dude. He's our local good-government warrior. He's the guy, after all, who fought John Street and his own Council-mates to pass ethics reform, wage-tax cuts, same-sex partner benefits and the smoking ban, and he did all of this in a proudly un-Street style: Where Street is a pedantic preacher, Nutter is precise, thoughtful.

"The Democratic Party at least as much as Republicans has been reform minded," said Richardson Dilworth, a professor of political science at Drexel University and grandson of the former Philadelphia mayor with the same name. "You have to think maybe Philadelphia doesn't have the ability to sustain a two party system."

Part Two: THE PAST

Philadelphia's GOP machine: *'The forces of evil were Republicans.'*

FROM MAY 11, 1858 TO Jan. 6, 1952, ONLY THREE DEMOCRATIC MAYORS LED PHILADELPHIA, LESS THAN A DECADE IN A CENTURY OF POLITICAL RULE. For 36 years, from January 1916 to 1952, not a single outside party broke a generation of Republican rule. Most interestingly is that Philadelphia's century of Republican rule came during years of dominant Democratic parties in Boston, New York and Chicago, the political machines of greatest fame.

But something was building after the 1940s. Men returned from military service abroad and floods of blacks running from the Jim Crow South came to Philadelphia, and the city took on 140,000 new residents between the 1940 and 1950 census, better than 85 percent of whom were from the latter group (Philadelphia Historic Census). Citizens reasserted their attention on a contented ruling party.

"World War II ended, and then the forces of reform were Democrats," said Voigt, Seventy's former executive director. "The forces of evil were Republicans."

The foundation of our four voter groups was set in the years after the Second World War. Any sensible liberal progressive knew if local reform were to be had, it would naturally come from the Democrats because of the fat and contented local GOP. De-industrialization had not taken full hold to chase away ethnic Democrats and registered Republicans, but the 1950s was the decade of suburbanization, which started the process, not slowed by the waves of Southern blacks, some of whom were already won over by Franklin D. Roosevelt's New Deal Democrats.

The last Republican mayor: *Just old 'Barney'*

Republican Bernard Samuel joined City Council on Jan. 1, 1940. Upon the death of Republican Mayor Robert E. Lamberton, Samuel was made mayor on Aug. 22, 1941. He won reelection in 1943 and 1947 margins, better than 60,000 and 90,000 votes respectively (Mayoral Election Totals).

Samuel had a public persona that could be, at times, described as playful, from sliding a ball cap backwards and crouching into a catcher's stance to post with little leaguers in a June 1951 photograph for the Philadelphia *Evening Bulletin* to his insistence that he was just old "Barney" to his friends (Calpri 1951).

Still, Samuel, whose ten years, four months and sixteen days as mayor makes him the longest serving chief executive in Philadelphia history, exemplified a Republican hegemony that was overturned at the end of his term. Indeed, if his tenure in City Council - three

months shy of 18 years - is included, Samuel enjoyed nearly three decades as one of the most powerful elected figures in Philadelphia.

When he moved into the mayor's office - then room 204 of City Hall - after the death of Bob Lamberton, Samuel inherited a city in deep fiscal trouble, something not rare in Philadelphia history but daunting for a new mayor nonetheless. By many accounts, Samuel served the city well. By the time the 71-year-old, with a rounded double-chin and heavy circles under his eyes after a generation of public service, finally relinquished his office to Joseph Clark, Jr. with a warm handshake in January 1951, Samuel had given more than 5,000 speeches, actively overseen hundreds of construction projects, helped bring the Democratic National Convention to the city, and, most importantly, returned the city's finances to the black, boasting a healthy surplus (Calpri 1951).

That work didn't much matter for his party.

In April 1951, Samuel's control over the mayoral post was suddenly thrown into tumult. That month, reformers, including the *Committee of Seventy*, finally pushed through the Home Rule Charter of 1951. Passed on April 17, it prohibited a mayor from serving more than two consecutive terms for the first time in the city's history (Home Rule Charter). The Republicans needed a new candidate, amid a series of citywide corruption scandals in the party.

Some of Samuel's supporters did try to bring him back into the fold over the summer. A provision from 1885 that prevented a mayor from succeeding himself had been lifted in the late 1940s, allowing Samuel to be the first man to be reelected since William Stokley in the 1870s. Samuel supporters thought that if in just five years mayoral term limits had been changed twice, they could be amended again. They never were, because something was begun during Samuel's last reelection campaign in 1947 (Erie 1988).

While he won handily, Samuel was opposed by a young lawyer who called for an ousting of the old guard. Richardson Dilworth lost to Bernard Samuel. But, in 1949, Dilworth was elected City Treasurer when Joseph Clark became City Controller, another young Democrat breaking through. Cracks in Republican power were showing. In 1950 Dilworth ran for Governor, also losing but, for the first time in more than 60 years, a Philadelphia Democrat was seen on the statewide scene. The Democrats in Philadelphia were gaining significant ground by leveraging small citywide offices and gaining name recognition even in defeat (Mayoral Election Totals).

So, when the Republicans chose a party man - Daniel A. Poling - they were severely outmatched by Clark, who beat Poling by more than 120,000 in the 1951 election with the help of a joint ticket with Dilworth, who captured the position of District Attorney. The pair became legends, and the Republicans suffered lesser defeats in the coming years.

White flight - including registered Republicans and many ethnic Democrats who could have been lured - launched to its height and during the late 1950s and the 1960s, the Democrats became the party of inclusion, leaving little question for younger blacks which party was theirs. With less Republicans, the Democrats in power to use the last vestiges of patronage - reformers or not - to further attract the working class, and Philadelphia's growing black ghettos becoming exclusively the ground of Democrats, the Meehans and the rest of the city's Republicans were rocked and rendered an afterthought. After a century of near complete control, Philadelphia's GOP was dropped from the conversation in 10 years.

"They never learn and they never change," began an editorial from the *Inquirer* calling for the end of the city's "60 years of GOP boss rule" (*Inquirer* 1951). In endorsing Democrat

Clark for mayor and Dilworth for district attorney in 1951, the *Inquirer* called Poling "the machine candidate for mayor." An ugly attack, but it may not be as direct as Dilworth referring to Poling as "a prisoner of the corrupt Republican organization."

The mayoral victory by Clark, who was succeeded by Dilworth, began a streak of 15 consecutive mayoral victories for the Democrats (Mayoral Election Totals). Philadelphia flipped the switch of reform and never turned it off again.

Under this Democratic reign, Republicans have been beaten by nearly 1.5 million votes or by an average of 100,000 votes every fourth November. Only three Republican candidates have managed to lose by less than 50,000 votes in that time, while two were toppled by more than 200,000 votes or by more than the populations of the state capitals of Pennsylvania, New Jersey, Delaware and Maryland *combined* (Mayoral Election Totals).

Close elections since: '*the lazy, lethargic Democratic machine*'

There have been close mayoral contests since then, though, and it is important to touch each. Since that 1951 election, Philadelphia has seen three conclude with two candidates less than 15,000 votes apart: in 1967, current U.S. Sen. Arlen Specter, R-Pa., lost to incumbent James H.J. Tate by less than 11,000 votes, proportionally the closest election in modern Philadelphia history, just a 1.5 percent margin of victory; in 1987, former Democratic Mayor Frank Rizzo lost to incumbent W. Wilson Goode by 14,000 votes, a 2.18 percent margin, and in 1999, businessman Sam Katz lost to City Council President John F. Street by 9,000 votes, a 1.72 percent margin (Fish 1999). In addition to these three, this paper will also review the 2003 rematch between Street and Katz. While Street beat Katz by some 80,000 votes, the attention paid to that election suggests another important variable in urban mayoral elections - national political influence (Mayoral Election Totals).

1967: James H.J. Tate versus Arlen Specter

"In 30 years you can make a lot of enemies, if you work at it," wrote Alicia Mundy in a 1992 profile for *Philadelphia* magazine. "And Arlen Specter is one of the hardest workers anyone knows."

Specter was a district attorney and became the powerful Senator he is today, but even he could not break through the Democratic stronghold in Philadelphia, then less than 20-years-old. Still, he did take part in the single closest mayoral election this city has ever seen.

The seminal *Philadelphia* magazine profile established Specter's past and his most cited characteristic, that of opportunism (Huber 2006).

Arlen Specter arrived in Philadelphia in 1956 as a liberal democrat. He grew up in Russell, Kansas, a town with about 6,000 folks, one of whom was Robert Dole [formerly] the Senate GOP leader. The perfect debater, Specter... trundled off to Yale Law School, where, to no one's surprise, he excelled. Armed with credentials and a few connections, he landed a job at the prestigious Philadelphia firm Dechert Price & Rhoads.

Almost from the beginning, he was telling people he wanted to be a U.S. Senator. Ambitious? If Cassius had a lean and hungry look, Arlen was positively anorexic. In 1959 he took a job as an assistant prosecutor in James Crumlish's district attorney's office, where he advanced rapidly, where he began to lay the foundation for his

political career, and where his legend began to grow. The first person he rolled over was his mentor, Crumlish, who quickly and memorably labeled Specter "a calculating calculator."

Specter first ran for public office in 1965, seeking to become district attorney. He was set to replace his Democratic mentor Crumlish, but when the man decided to run again, Specter met with then-city GOP general counsel Bill Meehan and ran as a Republican, though he remained a registered Democrat until after he won (Huber 2006).

His success as a district attorney fed his political appetite, as the *Philadelphia* magazine profile suggested (Huber 2006).

The reviews were so good that after only two years, Specter decided to challenge the incumbent mayor, Jim Tate, in a race that still resonates. For years, the lazy, lethargic Democratic machine had tolerated, even encouraged, incompetence and corruption throughout City Hall. The result was a 1967 race that pitted a man who couldn't win - the aging mayor - against a man who couldn't lose - the dashing D.A. But Tate was not a fool. He understood that two issues mattered most - keeping hard-nosed folk hero Frank Rizzo as police commissioner and supporting aid to the city's massive parochial school system. Tate promised both. Specter, troubled by the constitution pitfalls of funding religious schools, not wanting to be backed into a corner on future appointments - even though he said privately he had no intention of replacing his friend Rizzo - took a stand, on principle. He also lost - by just 11,000 votes. "It was," says attorney Gregory Harvey, a Democratic committeeman, "the last election in which he took a stand on principle."

1987: W. Wilson Goode versus Frank L. Rizzo

Steve Lopez was about as big as big city columnists get to be. The former *Inquirer* columnist was the man who, in December 1989, broke the news that then-district attorney and oft-political loser - now Pennsylvania Governor - Cannonball Ed Rendell hurled a snowball at a member of the Dallas Cowboys to help begin what became known as the "Snow Bowl." One of the too-many-to-mention incidents of Philadelphia fans indulging too much (Lopez 1995).

Lopez wrote with a sense of power and self-possession, knocking down politicians and playboys - often one in the same in Philadelphia - with a cutting wit and daring pen. He was an outsider, but Philadelphians had no choice but to forgive him for that.

He often related his California upbringing as a means to better understand Philadelphia. In May 1987, a Lopez column featured a supposed call from family in California. The caller was wondering what then-Mayor W. Wilson Goode was doing now that a grand jury presentment had called his administration "incompetent" and labeled the decision to drop a bomb on a West Philadelphia rowhome - which killed 11 - grossly negligent and showed a reckless disregard for life and property. Of course, Lopez was candid. "He's running for reelection." It was the same election in which a resurrected former-Democratic Mayor Frank Rizzo was running as a Republican.

"Do you mean it may be Goode against Rizzo in the general election? They could be the worst and second-worst mayors in United States history."
It's debatable.

"What is?"
Who's first and who's second.

But, of course, that was the Philadelphia mayoral battle in 1987.

In the days leading up to the election, it was clear just how racially involved the campaign had become. Goode was Philadelphia's first black mayor, a tangible success of the city's black power political movement, the start of which is mostly credited to state Sen. Hardy Williams, who ran for the Democratic mayoral nomination in 1971 - without the party's blessing and as the first black to do so (Gregory 2006).

Rizzo, on quite the other hand, is still remembered for his notorious, racial politics and divisiveness, perhaps more political choice than personal bigotry, as discussed by Rizzo's 1971 mayoral opponent, Republican Thatcher Longstreth, in his 1990 autobiography (Longstreth 1990, 255).

Actually, Rizzo has always treated black people pretty well; he probably [had] more black friends and admirers than most liberals have. But in the course of oversimplifying the issues, he tagged himself with an anti-black label, apparently because he and his advisers saw an advantage to catering to white fears.

Still, in 1971, Longstreth became the only Republican candidate to get a majority of the black vote - 85 percent - since World War II, simply because he wasn't Frank Rizzo (Longstreth 1990, 253).

So, Election Day 1987 was thought to be a race between Goode bringing in black voters and Rizzo bringing in his white constituents (Stevens 1987).

While opinion polls show Mr. Goode leading Mr. Rizzo, poll takers and other analysts consider the results inconclusive and say they expect the election to be close, with many voters disillusioned and indifferent.

"It's a turnout election," says Sandra Featherman, a political scientist at Temple University who is a longtime student of Philadelphia politics. "The percentage of blacks turning out has got to exceed the percent of whites turning out for Goode to win, and it's my guess that will happen."

If it does, she said, a style and an approach to mayoral politics, embodied by Mr. Rizzo, will have had its last hurrah in Philadelphia. Continuing to hold sway would be a newer style of government: less personal, more technocratic and more sensitive to racial minorities. That newer style, ushered in when former Mayor William Green succeeded Mr. Rizzo in 1979, has generally been continued by Mayor Goode, she said.

In the end, the race was tight, but Featherman was right. Goode escaped, perhaps not without thanks to the tail end of large-scale white flight. More than 130,000 whites left Philadelphia between 1980 and 1990, rendering the city 40 percent black. Less than two years removed from a city-dropped bomb that killed 11 and destroyed more than 60 homes, Goode won reelection over Philadelphia's once favorite son (Stevens 1987).

Of that West Philadelphia bomb, which was dropped to smoke out MOVE activists, a black-to-nature movement based in a Powelton Village rowhome, Goode told *Philadelphia* magazine in 2004 that it wasn't something that hurt him (Huber 2006).

"In the whole scheme of things, MOVE was a bad day," he told Roxanne Patel. "But it's not something that has ever, or that ever does, weigh me down."

Tom Ferrick, who became an *Inquirer* columnist in 1998 and retired this year, sees the 1987 election as more harmful than helpful to the city's Republican Party.

"Rizzo did death blows to the Republican Party," Ferrick said. "Rizzo fanned a rise of blacks in Democratic politics. He was still depending on old voting norms, but Rizzo's base was going out right around the time he was."

To return to our four groups of voters, Rizzo's switch to the Republican Party assured him that fourth. Even then, Rizzo was the furthest from a reform candidate, so his campaign clearly looked for support from the ethnic Democrat vote, once his base. But, signs show he overestimated their draw, as they weren't living in Philadelphia anymore, having followed the suburban dream.

What's more, however many blacks hadn't already given up on the Republican Party forever had a reason to do so in 1987, Ferrick said.

"I see Frank Rizzo as King Canute," he said, speaking of a legend of the 11th century Viking king. Canute moved his throne to the beach to show that a man cannot stop the waves.

While Rizzo's continued political dependence on his white ethnic supporters of the past - the so-labeled Rizzocrats - was likely not deliberately doomed.

"Rizzo," Ferrick said, "couldn't hold back the tide, either."

1999: John F. Street versus Sam Katz

City Republicans thought - if ever - 1999 was their year and Sam Katz was their man.

New York City and Los Angeles had Republican mayors for the first time in decades, Republican mayors decidedly similar to Katz, not ideological conservatives, but business-first technocrats. Katz had some name recognition, having run in the heated 1991 Republican mayoral primary and the 1994 gubernatorial primary, in the same way that outgoing and popular Democratic Mayor Ed Rendell had. Rendell lost a race for governor in 1986 and one for mayor in 1987 before moving into City Hall in 1991. Katz was widely regarded as an able fundraiser (Infield 1999).

In fall 1998, a year before the general election, Katz held a \$1,000-per-person reception at the Academic of Natural Sciences. It raised more than \$250,000 (Infield 1998). Katz, like his eventual Democratic opponent Street, expected to raise \$5 million for the general election, which they both exceeded (Zausner 1999).

Katz displayed confidence in his ability to fundraise when he happily aided another reason for GOP optimism - a crowded Democratic primary. Katz spent \$750,000 in TV and radio advertisements attacking Marty Weinberg and former state Rep. John White Jr., considered the chief opponents of former City Council President John F. Street, whom Katz felt was his best shot to win (Infield 1999).

"If there was a bitter, partisan fight that could leave the Democrats weakened, he would still have his campaign war chest intact," Mary Ellen Balchunis-Harris, a LaSalle University political scientist who follows city politics, told the *Inquirer* in 1998 (Infield 1998). That is just what happened.

Michael Meehan brought together other leading Republicans and urged them to get behind Katz. It was convincing enough that lawyer George Bochetto, Katz's primary rival, had already done so in October 1998 (Infield 1999).

Despite the support, Katz recognized his need to attract - beyond the same pool of Republicans - some portions of the other three broad groups of voters in Philadelphia, ethnic, lunch-pail Democrats, high-income liberal progressives and black voters.

"Sam Katz went out of his way in 1999 to avoid the Republican title," Street said.

But at 1:30 a.m., the morning after the election, Street learned he won, albeit narrowly. The *New York Times* characterized the campaign thusly:

Mr. Street, the second black mayor in the city's history, seemed mindful that the tight result means he will have to work hard to show he deserves the office. Much of the campaign was about school and safety problems that, despite impressive downtown renewal, have seen 150,000 middle and working-class residents leave the city in the last decade. Beyond that, municipal unions that suffered with the city through fiscally thin years are preparing to bargain hard with the new mayor for larger benefits now that this city of 1.4 million is considered on the rebound.

"I have been in this business a long time," Mr. Street told supporters. "I have not been perfect. I'm just going to ask you to give us a chance."

Mr. Katz, a 49-year-old consultant on the public-private financing of sports stadiums, said, "My opponent learn a lot about himself and this city."

A former Democrat with political ties to the black community, Mr. Katz rarely mentioned he was a Republican. He ran as a supporter of coalition government, private school vouchers and deeper cuts in the city's wage tax.

Mr. Street ran on his record as the ally of Mayor Rendell in bringing the city back from bankruptcy, and as a veteran of 19 years on the City Council and a proven master of the city's Democratic machine (Clines 1999).

Again, racial politics came into play, as perhaps as many as nine out of ten black voters supported Street and Katz mad necessary in-roads with white liberal reform-minded voters in his native Chestnut Hill and elsewhere. But, Katz came 8,000 votes too short among the three voting groups not his own to have.

"Sam was somewhat of an aberration," said Ellen Kaplan, a childhood friend of Katz's who worked as his issues director in 1999. "He is a Republican, and he wasn't. There was a Republican obstacle. For the GOP, he wasn't one of their own."

2003: John F. Street versus Sam Katz, Round Two

It was billed as a rematch of champions. It was the Democratic incumbent in a Democratic city squaring off against one of the most competitive Republican challengers in a half century. In 1999, their battle proved to be one of the closest in the centuries-old tradition of Philadelphia mayoral elections, but 2003 would end differently.

The question of race was apparent. In 1999, Katz was supported by many white Democrats, a trend not without urban mayoral precedent, as discussed in an essay written by Jeffrey Kraus, a professor of politics at *Wagner College* in the New York City borough of Staten

Island.

In New York City, the David Dinkins-Rudolph Giuliani contests of 1989 and 1993 demonstrated that race was an issue in the nation's largest and most diverse city. In 1993, the perception that Mayor Dinkins had been "soft on crime" and had been ineffective in dealing with a number of racial controversies cost him significant support among white Democratic voters, who opted to support Giuliani. The 2001 contest in the same city saw the Democratic Party's alliance of liberal whites, African-Americans, and Latinos unravel as the result of a racially divisive primary campaign, allowing a neophyte billionaire Republican to win.

New York was not alone. During the 1980s and 1990s a number of cities with elected African-American mayors saw those mayors succeeded by whites who often subscribed to more conservative policies than did their African-American predecessors. In the same year that Giuliani was elected in New York, Republican Richard Riordan became mayor of Los Angeles. In 1992, Bret Schundler became the first Republican mayor elected in Jersey City in 75 years. In Chicago, Richard M. Daley, the son of Richard J. Daley, was elected mayor following the death of Chicago's first African-American mayor, Harold Washington. Edward Rendell succeeded Wilson Goode, and in Baltimore Martin O'Malley replaced Kurt Schmoke. Like Giuliani, all stressed crime reduction, economic development, and fiscal discipline as prescriptions for urban revitalization (Kraus 2005).

A central issue of the 2003 election was whether Katz would benefit from Democratic white frustration with the Street administration or challenged by white Democrats who, having lived through four years with Street in charge, learned their left-leanings could be embraced once again because Street to be feared in the way he was once thought to be.

In some cities where African-American mayors have sought re-election their white support has actually increased as those voters found that their fears about a city administration led by an African-American mayor had not come to pass. In fact, a 1983 study found that African-American mayors expressed attitudes and followed policies that were not different from white mayors regarding fiscal policy (Kraus 2005).

Changes had come to Philadelphia's political climate. Early in the year, one of the city's few Republican elected officials, state Rep. John Perzel, became Speaker of the House of Representatives, a year after the city's former Mayor Ed Rendell became Governor, giving Philadelphia remarkable sway in the state Capitol.

Perhaps even more noteworthy is that George W. Bush became President of the United States just a year after the first match up between Street and Katz. In the ensuing years, Bush became the scourge of the Democrats and progressives that overwhelmingly populated the city of Philadelphia. With a Philadelphia Republican filling the state's highest legislative office and a polarizing Republican president in office, that party identification was even less popular in 2003 than it was in 1999, when Bill Clinton, considered an ally of then-Philadelphia Mayor Ed Rendell, was president. What's more is that Philadelphia had lost even more white residents, from some 644,000 in April 2000 to 615,000 (Committee of Seventy).

It seemed that the contest had even more reason to not be as close as the previous election had been, and yet strange things happen in Philadelphia mayoral elections, particularly when race - a campaign between black and white - is involved. So attention grew.

While Street tried to portray himself as the neighborhood candidate - a step away from his

Center City-focused predecessor Fast Eddie Rendell - Katz tried labeling Street a corrupt part of the Democratic machine, a clear swing at reform-minded liberal progressives, a group that had largely supported him in 1999. To do so, Katz focused on Street's own words, as reported by the *Associated Press*.

"The people who support me in the general election have a greater chance of getting business from my administration than the people who support Sam Katz," Street said in 1999 (Walters 2003).

Then the world collapsed.

In early October, a listening device was found in Street's City Hall office. Soon after, federal officials admitted it was planted by F.B.I. agents.

Going on the offensive, Mr. Street's campaign said federal investigators might have planted the device as part of a conspiracy by the Bush administration to undermine the mayor's integrity a month from the election.

"We are openly speculating and questioning the timing of this discovery with the backdrop of the next presidential election," a spokesman for the campaign, Frank Keel, said, "and quite frankly wondering aloud could the Republican Party of George Bush, John Ashcroft, etc., have engineered an incident like this that would cast some doubt and questions on the current Democratic mayor at a critical time in the election.

"State and federal Republican power brokers are pulling out all the stops to get their Republican candidate elected" (Dao 2003).

It was a masterful step in what has already become legendary political theater in Philadelphia.

Polls were showing the two candidates were running narrowly before the bug announcement, most with Street in the lead (Dao 2003). But in the weeks leading up to the election,

The effect of the bugging on the election was significant. In September 2003, a Temple University/CBS 3/KYW poll showed Mayor Street had the backing of 74% of African-American voters. Overall, Katz held a 46% to 40% lead. In early October, Street had taken a lead, with a Philadelphia Daily News/Keystone Poll having him ahead by eight percentage points, 42% to 34%. By late October, after the surveillance had been disclosed, Street continued to lead Katz, 48% to 41%. The bug appeared to galvanize Street's support in the African-American community, as 93% of African-American respondents indicated that they planned to vote for the Mayor. Professor Randall M. Miller, of St. Joseph's University, explained the effect of the bugging on African-American voters: "To many blacks, this seems like another example of someone coming after one of our own.... Even if they don't like Street, there is a sense of collective violation that works to the mayor's advantage" (Kraus 2005).

Election Analysis

The first three elections reviewed here left candidates within 20,000 votes of each other. They all are examples of elections during which Republican candidates - facing declining registered Republicans in each successive election and always with dramatically less than their Democratic challengers - made positive, though not ultimately successful, recruitment of voting blocs who have been otherwise likely to vote Democrat since the 1950s, if we return to our four groups.

1967

In 1967, Specter, perhaps even the favorite among analysts, was a clear candidate to take reform progressives, having been a young district attorney. But the Democratic machine was less than 20 years old, a small drop when compared with the city's former Republican control. Progressives still clearly identified with city Democrats. The national Democratic Party made it even harder for Specter to attract progressives and certainly black voters, as the Civil Rights movement - Philadelphia itself touched with its own 1963 race riot in North Philadelphia and lawyer Cecil B. Moore's work - was at its height. Robert Kennedy - liberal, reform progressive - and Martin Luther King Jr. - symbol of black empowerment - were both still alive. One was a Democrat and one's cause was - at least in the public view - Democratic, too.

So, while Specter's strengths may have been with the reform progressive group, because of national politics, his only real chance at cross over was with ethnic Democrats, the working class in South Philadelphia and stretches of the then-expanding Northeast. However, in an uncharacteristic political misstep for (a very green) Specter, he took a strong, ideological stand. He opposed making two campaign promises: funding Catholic schools and reappointing Frank Rizzo. There were no two issues with more broad appeal among working class whites in Philadelphia than keeping costs down on public school replacements and protecting the city's ethnic Democrat folk legend, Frank Rizzo. Specter did neither, and he lost the election - despite a vulnerable Democrat.

1987

"Race is always involved in politics in Philadelphia," said Mandel, the tax reformer. "People say that about other cities, but in Philadelphia, even when race isn't involved, it is still involved."

If that's the case, it will come as no surprise that one of the more racially polarizing elections in local campaign history may have happened in Philadelphia in 1987: when the city's first black mayor squared off against the alleged race baiter and legendary former mayor.

But Rizzo's misstep was in aligning himself with the two groups of our four voting blocs that were declining most in the 1980s: Republicans and white ethnics, or lunch-pail Democrats, his "Rizzocrat" base.

He energized the black voting base and liberal progressives, having to choose from two machine politicians, swung to their Democratic Party affiliation - even though Goode was

not far from one of the most destructive moves in modern urban government. In a later section on race, this will be reviewed further.

1999 & 2003

In 2003, Sam Katz was supposed to be a more broadly supported candidate, when accounting for our four voting blocs.

Labor unions - often representing working class Democrats - had all but entirely supported Street in 1999. Four years later, they were divided, perhaps as many as a dozen supporting Katz. The city's Teamsters, Gas Workers Employee Union Local 686, Philadelphia Firefighters Union Local 22, the Fraternal Order of Housing Police and districts of the carpenters and AFSCME and others were behind the Republican (Kraus).

Additionally, in early fall, more than a quarter of black voters were not supporting Street - a portion of whom were likely Katz voters, and the Republican nominee's base was among the city's reform progressives, particularly when contrasted with Street as an opponent.

For much of the general election, Katz appeared to be making impressive strides in attracting members of two groups on which he had the least impact on in 1999 - black voters and working class Democrats. With registered Republicans and his reform base, Katz, one might think, should have won.

But something changed between the two elections, a racial element that will be discussed later in this paper.

One academic - a prototypical member of the reform-minded class of our four voting blocs, with a doctorate, leftist leanings and a home in Katz's elite, native Chestnut Hill neighborhood - seemed to embody a key switch over between Street-Katz 1999 and Street-Katz 2003.

"In 1999 I just thought Street was so vile," she said. "So, I voted for Sam Katz, the first and last Republican vote I have ever made because in 2003 Street didn't seem so dangerous."

In 1999, more than three quarters of the vote in Roxborough, Chestnut Hill and Manayunk was for Katz but dropped to 68 percent in 2003. That seven point slide came in Center City, Fairmount and University City, too - from 68 to 61 percent - districts that largely feature reform minded progressives mixed among ethnic Democrats in Fairmount (Committee of Seventy).

Similarly, successes he made among working class Democrats in 1999 - perhaps some on the basis of fears of Street - were struck deeply in 2003. In South Philadelphia, Katz lost nearly 10 points, from 77 in 1999 to 68 four years later. He made similar drops in working class Northeast neighborhoods like Mayfair, Frankford and Rhawnhurst. In Port Richmond, Kensington and Bridesburg - among the poorer white neighborhoods in Philadelphia - Katz went from 76 to just over 63 percent of the vote in 2003, the worst drop he suffered in any of the city's regions (Committee of Seventy).

After the bug, nearly 95 percent of the black vote polled as Street supporters, reform

liberals identified with their mayor and his supposed plight against a President that was becoming increasingly distasteful among their ranks (Kraus 2005). What's more, when reviewed academically, Sam Katz may really never had a chance in 2003, a bug or not. The national attention that flooded Philadelphia after the listening device was found in incumbent Democratic Mayor John Street's City Hall office only served to make that more pronounced. It also served to show the true failings of Philadelphia's Republican Party.

In 1999, the Democrats were shocked. Never had an election been separated by so few votes in the city's modern mayoral history. The Republicans should have tasted blood. Yet, between April 2003 and the general election, more than 86,000 new Democratic voters were added, led by a U.S. Congressman and Street ally Chaka Fattah voter registration drive. During that same period, less than 8,000 new Republican voters were added (Kraus 2005).

That meant that while Katz must have thought he faced tough odds in 1999, as just 19.4 percent of registered voters were Republican, by 2003, that total had fallen to 17.6 percent (Committee of Seventy).

The Katz campaign could only hope those voters didn't show up. When the world pays attention to a mayoral contest, voters tend to show up, and the world was paying attention to Philadelphia after the bug was discovered. So, voting blocs that were once possible-Katz supporters, instead rallied with their mayor, new registered voters showed up to vote in a local election, and Street surged forward.

The Meehans and the city Republican Committee: *"Bill Meehan was losing too. He was just better at getting shit."*

It is stunning to think how far Philadelphia Republicans have fallen. Sam Katz remains the most recognizable name and face for the party in the city, but he has yet to win public office.

The one constant has been the Meehan family, a power share begun by Austin Meehan, grandfather to the current GOP general counsel Michael Meehan, as three-time Republican mayoral loser Thatcher Longstreth wrote in his autobiography.

For more than a generation, Sheriff Austin Meehan was the most powerful and influential Republican in Philadelphia. His interest in politics stemmed from two motives: his love of power and his love of people. He exerted a hold on people that had to be seen to be believed, largely because he performed so many favors for so many people.

Virtually every night of his life, Meehan held court in his home after dinner until midnight. A steady stream of supplicants would come to him with problems - usually people looking for jobs or trying to get a street fixed or a son into college. If Meehan felt there was any chance he could help them, he would try. Even after he was voted out of the sheriff's office, he remained on such good terms with the Democrats that he could get things done strictly on a personal basis. The size and devotion of his following was such that when he died in 1961 and I went to his wake, I had to walk nine blocks to reach the end of the line (Longstreth 1990, 199-200)

There were other powerful Republicans then, including Bill Meade, generally noted for being

masterfully manipulative, and Bill Hamilton, whose family had extreme influence in Roxborough's 21st ward, among the last to go Democrat (Longstreth 1990, 201).

As Republican power waned, Meehan family control waxed, at least in the party. After his father's 1961 death, Bill Meehan took over the crown. While a popular leader, like his father, Bill Meehan suffered a still-declining voter base, to which he had no answer, though he tried to use what power he had.

"Bill Meehan was losing too," said Kelly, the young Republican reformer. "He was just better at getting shit."

It became increasingly difficult for city Republicans to extract patronage jobs and exact influence over city contracts. Whether that has anything to do with the abilities of the three generations of Meehan city GOP rule is difficult to evaluate, but perceptions remain that Bill Meehan was nearer in relative influence to his father, than Michael is to his own, Kelly said.

There is little question that the comparisons are unfair in today's divergent political climate, particularly considering what northeast cities have had to overcome since Austin Meehan's rule - racial upheaval, suburban expansion, de-industrialization, job loss, growth of the sun belt, and more.

"But it comes down to wins and losses," Kelly said, without apology. "I have no vendetta against Michael, but we've had the Meehans for a long time. This isn't good for Philadelphia."

Successes in other citywide offices: *The last real Republican in Philadelphia*

Like City Hall, the Meehans have found it similarly difficult to find success in lesser citywide offices, so those victories they have had become important to understand.

In 1953, the party won a city controller election. Trial lawyer Mort Witkin was generally credited with winning the campaign by portraying a Republican controller as a healthy check for Democratic Mayor Joseph Clark (Longstreth 1990, 201). Why this hasn't worked since has much to do with demographics, which we'll discuss later, but it is important to understand that in the 1950s, Democrats finally cast themselves as a balance for a powerful Republican machine. Considering a lengthy hegemony has set in for the Democrats since then, city Republicans have failed themselves and Philadelphia. This is also why Michael Nutter winning the 2007 mayoral election, as previously discussed, dressed a reformer of his own party should seem so threatening to any GOP revival.

The 1953 win, just two years after the city's GOP lost City Hall, came at a time when white flight was reaching its peak, upper-income whites - largely Republicans - were beginning to leave for Philadelphia's growing suburbs and lower-income blacks - largely Democratic - were coming from the U.S. South (Philadelphia Census Data). It was the start of nearly 40 years of urban decay and middle-class exodus that, perhaps counter intuitively, has cemented control for the now in-power party.

But, Philadelphia Republicans have had other successes, however small and isolated, that should speak to the possibilities.

After Arlen Specter's 1965 ascension to district attorney, the first Republican elected to the post in 18 years, Specter failed at capturing City Hall in 1967, as discussed earlier.

Undeterred, Specter retook the district attorney seat in 1969, accompanied by a former La Salle University basketball stand out and N.B.A. All-Star Tom Gola, who successfully ran for comptroller. The campaign is still lauded by political scientists, highlighted by their slogan: "They are young, they are tough, and nobody owns them" (CPI 1996).

There are lessons there, too. The recurring one is how necessary a message of reform is for city Republicans, and youth is an unquestioned portion of that. Another message here is one of name recognition, which will be discussed later. Gola was a familiar name without the enemies a politician of his fame would almost certainly have accrued. Perhaps his work with Specter gave hold to Gola's 1983 GOP mayoral primary loss.

In 1985, Republican Ronald D. Castille, now a state Supreme Court justice, was elected district attorney (Infield 1998).

"Ron Castille was the last real Republican who was groomed and became successful in Philadelphia," said Miller, the St. Joseph's history professor.

Dave Glancey, the Democratic counterpart to Bill Meehan from December 1979 to 1983, credits the Meehan in the middle for some of these victories.

"He was the man behind the curtain. His currency was his word," Glancey said. "But, of course, he expected it back from everyone."

Castille's win was the last citywide victory for which the Republicans can take credit at all. Michael Meehan has yet to break through. If Bill Meehan ruled through the darkest days of modern urban American - tough times for a predominately white, business-first political party - and Philadelphia has turned a corner, as Glancey suggested, perhaps, more should be expected of Michael Meehan and the city's GOP.

"There are no excuses anymore," Kelly, the reformer said. "There can be a Republican Party in Philadelphia."

"Or at least there has to be. Because, if not, what else?"

Part Three: COMPARISONS WITH OTHER CITIES

Two-party systems in other cities: "*Being a Republican does matter...*"

LOCAL POLITICS ARE A FESTERING MASS OF ANTAGONISMS, A PLACE WHERE SELF-INDULGENT INCUMBENTS ARE CHALLENGED BY REFORM CANDIDATES, WHO, IN TURN, BECOME VILE ENOUGH TO BE REFORMED. Yet, redistricting and political maneuvering has allowed for town councils and city offices to seem almost oligarchic in much of the country, from school boards to U.S. Congress. For example, Rep. John Dingell, D-MI, has been in office since 1955 (Dingell).

But change happens, exchanges of power are healthy. The largest cities in the country with our most diverse populations should be particularly adept at change, and, unlike Philadelphia, some cities have seen party turnover.

Since Jan. 7, 1952, when Joseph. Clark, Jr. entered the second floor mayor's office in

Philadelphia's City Hall to begin a still uninterrupted run of Democrats as the city's top executive, New York City has seen three Republicans win its mayoralty: John Lindsay in 1966, Rudy Giuliani in 1994 and Michael Bloomberg, who succeeded Giuliani in 2002 and still runs the city. Since the 1840s, when Philadelphia's mayors were first popularly elected, the Quaker City has seen just five changes in party incumbency (Mayoral Election Totals). In the same time, New York City has seen 18 such changes.

Since the 1880s, Los Angeles has had more regular transitions of party power than perhaps any other city in the country. Most recently, Richard J. Riordan served as a Republican mayor from 1993 to 2001. Before him, C. Norris Poulson served as a Republican mayor from 1953 to 1961, just as Philadelphia was beginning its uninterrupted Democratic reign.

Cleveland has had a Republican mayor both in the 1980s - George V. Voinovich from 1980 to 1989 - and the 1970s - Ralph J. Perk, from 1972 to 1997. Since the 1950s, Baltimore has had just one Republican, Theodor R. McKeldin, who also served a term in the 1940s, but McKeldin won a chance to lead the city's development of its inner harbor at a time when its black population was burgeoning (.).

Between 1911 and 1963, only the GOP led San Francisco. Since then, a city considered to be the country's most progressive-leaning has, unsurprisingly, gone Democratic, but San Francisco's GOP has regular, public meetings, an active online presence and stumps for local and national Republican candidates (SFRP).

"Being a Republican," wrote Chairman Howard Epstein on their Web site, "does matter in San Francisco" (SFRP)

Bret Schundler stunned some by leading from 1993 to 2001 Jersey City, where Democrats outnumbered Republicans 10 to one. Not long after his term ended and Schundler moved toward eventually failed gubernatorial aspirations, *Campaign and Elections' Politics Magazine* reviewed the political stranglehold he took of a Democratic city (Jalonick 2002).

"The Republican Party is a patronage system," Schundler said. "It is about jobs."

If Philadelphia Republicans don't have control over jobs anymore, other directives need to be used. Still, Schundler developed a political base along the old lines of patronage with a message of change and efficiency - though a killer media blitz didn't hurt (Jalonick 2002).

The Democratic cities: 'I'm declaring that God himself will help us.'

It is disingenuous to suggest Philadelphia is alone in its one-party quagmire.

As previously noted, both Boston and Chicago have longer stays of Democratic control. Though New Orleans includes complications discussed later, that city's last admitted Republican mayor - because elections there are now nonpartisan - was Benjamin Flanders, elected in 1870 (Mikell 2007).

Since the bombing of Pearl Harbor, just two Republicans have been mayor in Minneapolis, Minn. - after a 1957 victory and a single-day, interim reign in 1973. The party's trouble in the city extends elsewhere.

Ordained minister Barb Davis White is running this November for U.S. Congress in Minnesota's 5th district, which includes all of Minneapolis, a city of 370,000. More than 75 percent of Minneapolis voters are Democratic and the 5th district has been in Democratic

hands since 1963. It continued when.

"I'm calling out to the masses, black and white, Hispanic, African, Asian," a local TV news station reported she said in announcing her endorsement in May. "I'm declaring that God himself will help us when we the people get up" (Croman 2008).

The racial implications of Davis White - a black woman - running as a Republican against Keith Ellison - a first-term, white liberal - will be discussed later. But it comes as no surprise that Davis White isn't the favorite in the Democratic district.

In fact, the election is seen more as a tactic to limit Democratic advances in other parts of the battleground state of Minnesota.

"It forces Ellison to raise money and spend money in his district," David Schultz, a lecturer at the University of Minnesota School of Law, told the TV station. "As opposed to raising it and spending it elsewhere for others."

Though Philadelphia isn't alone, its Republicans are among the country's largest, most struggling. That alone makes our exploration of why other cities have some Republican force fair.

Group conflict and mayoral voting: '*When racial conflict recedes, voting behavior will likely revert to... normal...*'

Karen M. Kaufmann, an associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland, thought it an interesting enough concept to dedicate a 2004 book to the subject, entitled *The Urban Voter*.

How could presumably liberal cities with large minority populations elect Republican mayors? Why did large numbers of white Democrats abandon their long-standing party identifications in support of these Republican candidates? What did these victories mean for the future of city politics and the minority empowerment that had come to characterize many urban regimes Kaufmann 2004, 5).

Her primary argument is that contemporary local elections are the beneficiaries of particularly loyal partisan voters, unless prolonged conflict encourages voters to find other identifications, most notably race. That is, municipal elections are followed even less closely by Americans than national and state elections, so voters seek shortcuts. Democrats will be more likely to vote Democrat in a local election than, necessarily, a national election, unless a campaign deviates from an issues-oriented focus.

Rudolph Giuliani in New York City and Richard Riordan in Los Angeles took office with economic and racial strife plaguing their cities, cities with rampant crime and double-digit unemployment rates (Kaufmann 2004, 151).

While issues were there, most notably in Riordan's victory after the Rodney King beating by Los Angeles police, both men benefited from white Democrats who were more likely to be wary of black candidates.

"When elections take place in a conflictual environment, voting behavior will likely reflect the temporal salience of these interests," wrote Kaufmann. "However, when racial conflict recedes, voting behavior will likely revert to more normal political considerations such as party identification or political ideology" (Kaufmann 2004, 5).

Integral to her point is that after a fairly successful term by Riordan, Los Angeles government returned Democratic in 2001 and has remained so since.

Interestingly, two of the three last, close mayoral elections that Philadelphia has seen involve black Democrats and white Republicans, which created racial tensions. By Kaufmann's model and as discussed earlier, Rizzo should have benefited from running against a black candidate two years removed from presiding over a city government that had killed 11 residents and destroyed 60 homes. Goode was the city's first black mayor and had been in power on perhaps Philadelphia's darkest day.

Like Rizzo and Goode in 1987, the second recent mayoral election that saw an increase in racial tensions when a black Democrat and a white Republican came in 1999. Sam Katz, too, took white Democrats from Street, but Katz failed to make serious inroads among black voters - more to follow.

"Sam Katz," said Miller, the St. Joseph's professor. "He was doing more than just paying lip service to black voters."

Non-white voting in Philadelphia: 'A huge portion of this puzzle is the rise of black political power.'

Black political power first became a serious development in Philadelphia during the 1970s (Gregory 2006).

In 1971, as previously noted, state Sen. Hardy Williams ran for the Democratic mayoral nomination in 1971 - without the party's blessing and as the first black to do so. He failed, but a movement began.

The Rev. William H. Gray III won the second U.S. Congressional district in 1978 and became a driving force, establishing his now famed Northwest Alliance. The North Philadelphia reverend was known to raise funds nationally and distribute them locally with the expressed intent of breaking apart established white Democratic elite circles, names like former state Sen. Buddy Cianfrani and former City Councilman Jimmy Tayoun, who, as *Philadelphia* magazine put it in 2007, "sat in a smoky room and picked which hacks would represent black wards" (Fagone 2007).

"We said, 'Hey, political office is not a reward for party loyalty.'" Gray told the magazine. "You got to be talented."

Philadelphia's pool of talented black leaders today are largely of Gray's Northwest Alliance, like Gray congressional replacement Chakah Fattah, powerful Chairman of the state House Appropriations Committee Dwight Evans, Councilwoman Marian Tasco, and even the younger, now Mayor Michael Nutter. The city's black power share has grown large enough that it too has fractured, most clearly seen in a growing West Philadelphia camp led by Fattah, as evidenced in a March 2006 cover story by *Philadelphia Weekly*. Still, it is that coalition that created black power in Philadelphia, made them Democrat and has kept them Democrat (Gregory 2006).

"There were older black Republicans in the 1970s, remnants of when Democrats were synonymous with the one-party South," said Ferrick, the *Inquirer* columnist. "A huge portion of this puzzle is the rise of black political power, particularly in Philadelphia."

Black leaders gained power and voters gain a voice within the city's Democratic Party, leaving the Republican Party beyond option to many blacks. Looking at the most competitive elections the city has had, the most common stumbling block for Republicans

has been a black voting bloc that is unfriendly to the GOP.

In 1999, one Republican fear that proved prescient was that in a decade during which New York City and Los Angeles elected Republican mayors - Giuliani and Riordan - blacks were a much larger percent of the vote in Philadelphia (Infield 1998). Less than 30 percent of New York City's population in 1990 was black, and Los Angeles's black population has hovered around 10 percent since then.

So, while Katz stole white Democrats from Street, more than 90 percent of black voters in the city supported John Street rather than Katz (Clines 1999). For further analysis, take the 21st ward, in the city's lower northwest region. The 21st is majority Democrat and majority white. In 1999, more than 80 percent of voters supported Katz. In each North Philadelphia ward - 11, 13, 14, 16, 20, 28, 29, 32 and 37 - Street garnered better than 92 percent of the vote from those overwhelmingly black neighborhoods (Committee of Seventy).

Investigating other cities which have had Republican mayors shows similar themes amid its black populations, while a city like Chicago - with an even longer Democratic mayoral hegemony - has, like Philadelphia, long had a large black population. Better than a third of its 2.7 million residents today are black. More than 40 percent of Philadelphia's 1.5 million are black.

Jersey City had a sizable black population in 1993 when Schundler became its first Republican mayor in 75 years. Though it was still less than a third - similar to New York City's sum - Schundler was further aided by a splintering of the black vote between two black opponents (*New York Times* 1992).

Local Lessons for National Parties: 'You ain't much, but you all we got'

It is generally accepted that President Franklin D. Roosevelt's promise of a New Deal for struggling Americans first brought blacks into the Democratic fold, abandoning the party of Abraham Lincoln and Emancipation. FDR's move was bolstered by the Kennedys and Lyndon Baines Johnson's support for civil rights legislation in the 1960s.

In the next 40 years, Republican candidates have seen declining portions of the black vote, reaching the lowest point yet in 2000 when George W. Bush garnered just 8 percent. Perhaps noting the social conservatism and religiousness of many blacks, Republicans have taken a new interest in reaching out, a move often credited to the national GOP Chairman Ken Mehlman, who, in 2005, apologized for Nixon-era's "Southern strategy" of attracting white voters through racial polarization surrounding integration (Balz 2006).

Republicans have added Latino voters since the 1990s as that population has grown. However, civil rights legislation led to the majority of black voters identifying with the Democratic Party and the Democratic party alone. Hispanics haven't found reason to develop such loyalty to either major party, and the immigration reform debate seems unlikely to reach necessary levels of dynamism that appears to court a voting bloc indefinitely (Balz 2006).

To understand the racial divide of party loyalty between blacks and Hispanics, for example, we can look at the in the 7th councilmanic district in Philadelphia, currently represented by Maria D. Quinones-Sanchez. The Democrat is the only Hispanic on Philadelphia's City Council. Her district includes the 7th ward, which includes the city's 5th Street corridor, the center of a rich Puerto Rican community and other Hispanic contingents near neighborhoods to the east with other Central American peoples. As recent as the April 22 presidential primary in Pennsylvania, nearly one-third of voters in the largely Hispanic 7th ward were Republican. Some 4,000 were Democrat (Committee of Seventy).

Blacks in Philadelphia and elsewhere have proven more loyal to Democrats. Yet limiting their choice to the Democratic primary likely makes their cause less salient. If blacks will only vote for Democrats, there is no motivation for a candidate from either major party to court black voters. So far, black Republican candidates, a distinction that grew in popularity in the 2006 election cycle, have proven largely incapable of swaying black voters, a dangerous trend for black voters, as John McWhorter, a senior fellow at the Manhattan Institute, suggested in an Op-Ed written for the *New York Sun* (McWhorter 2006).

So when Lynn Swann ran against incumbent Pennsylvania Gov. Ed Rendell, who was largely popular in the state's southeast corner, which includes his Philadelphia home and a preponderance of black voters, it was duly noted that Swann tanked, in losing by more than 20 points. Polls showed black voters pulling for Rendell more than six to one over Swann (Quinnipiac 2006).

Swann was supposed to be part of a new crop of black Republicans who could sway black voters to the Republican fold (Dao 2005). In 2006, Swann was joined by Michael Steele, who lost a race for the U.S. Senate, and Kenneth Blackwell, who lost a bid for Ohio Governor. In September 2007, four Republican presidential candidates skipped out on a forum on black issues (Kranish 2007).

Three-time Republican mayoral candidate Thatcher Longstreth carried 85 percent of the black vote in 1971, though, Longstreth himself admitted, it had more to do with his opponent - Frank Rizzo, the law-and-order candidate with a political strategy of motivating whites by alienating blacks. In his autobiography, Longstreth wrote of his campaigning on what is now Cecil B. Moore Avenue in central North Philadelphia. "You ain't much," said a black woman who recognized him. "But you all we got" (Longstreth 1990, 253).

Longstreth lost to the favored Rizzo by less than 50,000 votes, surely aided by inroads among blacks (Mayoral Election Totals). Republicans can win blacks in Philadelphia, particularly if the circumstances - like a Democrat who takes the bloc for granted or is as distasteful as Rizzo - help. Longstreth, a native of liberal Chestnut Hill, scooped Republican voters, a portion of the reform-minded and, as suggested, blacks, to use again our four voting blocs. Considering Rizzo had already developed a cult following among the city's white ethnics and benefited some from registered Democrats, Longstreth was forced to build coalitions elsewhere. His Democratic crossover, aside from blacks, wasn't enough.

What competitive elections mean: *'It is not necessary to assume cities should have two-party systems.'*

"We're urban Republicans," said Michael Meehan, the city's Republican committee general counsel. "We offer a different point of view. Republicans in Iowa and Nebraska are not exposed to what goes on here."

It is a theme long held in Philadelphia's losing Republican Party.

"You might say to the Democrats in a suburban county, 'Why do you exist?'" Meehan said. "We don't limit ourselves by looking at just regular Republicans."

Indeed, they don't. Sam Katz was a Democrat turned Republican, largely thought to be a way to avoid the tougher Democratic primary. As mentioned earlier, Arlen Specter became a Republican simply for the chance to run for district attorney in 1965. He won, but remained a registered Democrat even after he won (Huber 2006). It was Specter who hired Ed Rendell and Lynn Abraham in the city's district attorney's office. Rendell took over for Specter and is now Pennsylvania's Democratic governor and Abraham is the city's

Democratic district attorney today. Frank Rizzo was a Republican, then a Democrat, and then a Republican again. If we return to our four voting blocs, in a city in which a small portion of registered Republicans, this switchover isn't just inevitable, it is necessary.

It happens elsewhere. New York City's John Lindsay didn't win the Republican Party's nomination during his reelection campaign, so he switched to a liberal outgrowth of the Democratic Party for his second term. Bloomberg, a lifelong registered Democrat, successfully avoided his city's contentious Democratic primary by switching to the Republican Party. He received endorsements from prominent New York City Democrats, including former city mayor and TV judge Ed Koch, former New York Gov. Hugh Carey and several councilmen and congressional representatives.

"In many respects Sam Katz was more liberal than I am," said Street, Kat's Democratic rival. "It was my sense that most local Republicans didn't care for Sam Katz."

"John Street would have been a Republican if he thought he could get elected as one," Meehan, the Republican general counsel, confirmed. Urban Democrats seem to be a party of victory, not of any ideological unity. Kaufmann, the author of *The Urban Voter*, said that has developed in every major city, including New Orleans, where its black mayor - like Street - may have characteristics more fitting a Republican title.

"Ray Nagin played on white indifference for political gain," she said. "But his original backers were wealthy businessmen... He's a Democrat in name only."

"The Republican Party works with the Democratic Party more than anyone else in the city," said Dilworth, the Drexel professor. "It is not necessary to assume cities should have two-party systems."

If the party affiliation of a local candidate doesn't necessarily reflect his ideological, the debate is muddled and the message of a local party may likely be more important.

Why a Republican Party exists: *'They make city politics more competitive.'*

"What's the alternative?" said Kelly, the Philadelphia Republican reformer. "There needs to be some check."

Republican Fiorello LaGuardia served three mayoral terms in New York City from 1934 to 1945. He was a supporter of Democrat President Roosevelt's New Deal and developed his base around the city's white, liberal reform voters, a middle-class typically reserved - particularly in cities - for Democrats. Those motivations and his devotion to social and urban development all seem to suggest a Democrat, but he was anti-corruption candidate and became a Republican because of an allegiance to defeating the city's Tammany Hall Democratic machine. His Republican status was a check on otherwise unchecked Democratic rule.

"Republicans always have the argument that they make city politics more competitive," said Davies, the political writer for the *Philadelphia Daily News*. "I don't think the Republican Party has been an abject failure. You have to put their successes in the context of big city American politics."

Part Four: ANALYSIS

Reviving a two-party system: *'The Republican name is an enormous albatross.'*
EVERYONE AGREES A FAILING REPUBLICAN PARTY IS BAD, AND EVERYONE HAS THEIR OWN THOUGHTS ON WHY IT'S BAD.

"One-party rule is dangerous. The best policy comes when compromise is required," said former Mayor Street. "I don't think they're nurturing young people."

It is safe to assume urban demographic changes, coupled with its own corrupt machine past, knocked the Republican Party off its century of control, and most tend to agree with Street that the city's GOP has since failed in recruiting young talent.

If we look back at the city's three most competitive elections since the 1950s, sagging Republican registrations has also proved a worsening obstacle. In 1967, when Arlen Specter ran as a Republican, nearly 40 percent of voters were Republican. For Rizzo's fight against Goode in 1987, it was less than a quarter, and in 1999, just under one in five voters were Republicans. Of course, it is getting even worse, as about 15 percent of voters were Republicans for the 2007 mayoral election (Committee of Seventy).

In a draining pool, the Philadelphia Republican delegation to Harrisburg is arguably the largest fish for the city's GOP. The current Speaker of the Pennsylvania House of Representatives and his predecessor are both Philadelphia Republicans, Denny O'Brien and John Perzel respectively, as previously noted.

"I don't know if they have ever spoken for or were thought to be speaking for Philadelphia," said Miller, the St. Joseph's professor.

Rep. George Kenney, who is retiring, is the newest addition to the Philadelphia Republican state legislators, having been elected in 1984, which means the city's GOP has had no significant successes for more than 20 years.

"Too many think Michael and Vito don't take seriously winning elections. If it's true, it doesn't matter," said Katz, of the city's Republican committee leadership. "The Republican name is an enormous albatross."

Nonpartisan elections: *'The poorly educated are the first to ignore elections without party representation.'*

Some in urban political spheres think withdrawing party affiliation altogether is the best way to create a healthy political process among diverse populations. Phoenix, Seattle, Houston and New Orleans have all done so. All have had candidates in recent years who could be described as Republican-like, if current Mayor Ray Nagin's business leanings and social conservatism could be counted for the Big Easy. Still, many academics reject the notion.

"Nonpartisan elections were devised to reduce turnout, which it does at the expense of already underrepresented voters," said Kaufmann, the University of Maryland politics professor. "Nonpartisan elections are detrimental to minority voters... The poorly educated are the first to ignore elections without party representation."

Some Philadelphia Democrats recognize that and perhaps see it as a threat to their hegemony, as at least a segment of their voter base is poor, uneducated and black.

"To have nonpartisan elections, well, most Democrats would be against it. It would be just to compensate for the Republican Party," said former Mayor Street. "For African-Americans, it would dilute power. I would question the motives behind it."

Still, those who have faced the daunting challenge of a Republican title in Philadelphia might be more open and question the academic response.

"Nonpartisan elections are something we ought to look at," said Ellen Kaplan, who was Katz's issues director in 1999. "I don't think it's healthy to have just one party. That is what dissuades people from getting involved."

But Katz himself thinks the process makes the idea not worth pursuing anyway, as he wrote in an e-mail April 7, 2008.

As a practical matter, election law is controlled by the state, i.e. the legislature. Those laws are made by incumbents. The state has very few legislative and senate districts that are generally considered to be "in play." So getting members of the House and Senate to vote for a system that would put their renomination at greater risk by enabling people outside of the party that nominated them to have a voice isn't something we're likely to see anytime soon. Pursuing it as a political agenda item, would, in my view, be a waste of time and energy.

Even Meehan, the embattled Republican general counsel, dismissed the idea.

"Philadelphia would be worse off with nonpartisan elections," he said.

Similarly, Kevin Kelly, the Republican reformer, rejected the notion as meaningless.

"Two sides mean harmony. There will always be two strata, whether you have names for them or not," he said. "Those on the left think people are basically good... I think people are basically flawed. Nonpartisan elections will still always boil down to those two camps."

Fighting the Republican name: '*never walked the walk*'

Dave Glancey, a lifetime Democrat and former city chairman, has some advice.

"You can build bottom up, but sometimes you got to go big. Invite a big name, the biggest start they can who can collect the most money, run him and build your party underneath that," Glancey suggested. "I remember writing to Julius Erving, just to let him know the Democrats in this city could find a spot for him. They simply haven't recruited."

Tom Gola, the former basketball star turned successful running mate of Arlen Specter, comes to mind as an example from the past. But, recruiting itself is likely difficult in Philadelphia today. It may be a case of the GOP being unable to recruit because they didn't recruit.

"Right now, you can't say who Republicans are in this city, what they are, where they are, *why* they are," said Miller of St. Joseph's. "So we put national politics on them, which will only fail them, particularly in black and young progressive communities."

Many say it begins with standing for something.

"The Republicans have never walked the walk of reform," said Davies of the *Daily News*. "When they have gotten power it has been a disappointment."

Davies cited their electing Milton Street - brother of then-Democratic Mayor John Street - to the parking authority commission, after he served as a Republican state senator in the early 1980s, after he served as a Democratic state representative in the 1970s. Their waffling on Street and his personal action is an example of the city's GOP failing to serve as a source of reform, Davies said.

"He was an utter buffoon," Davies said of Milton. "It just shows that they were patronage grubbing hacks."

"In the 1980s, there was a real nucleus in the Republican Party. Denny O'Brien, George Kenney, John Taylor, John Perzel in the Northeast, and Chris Wolgan," Davies said. The work they have done has been in Harrisburg, he said, as mentioned earlier.

"Republicans here are geared to leadership in Harrisburg," said Goldsmith, the former managing director. "They take positions on issues that are not aligned with their constituents in Philadelphia."

The city's Republican delegation to the state Capitol are largely seen as moderate or too left-leaning in Harrisburg, but Goldsmith said, too conservative in Philadelphia, beyond their representative districts.

Michael Meehan sees it differently.

"To get things done, we need friends in Washington and Harrisburg. In a state like Pennsylvania, there are those who are running against the city. We're criticized for regionalism, but the Convention Center, the stadiums, the Republicans made that happen," Meehan said, waving out over the city through the large window of his 22nd floor Wolf Block office. He also mentioned federal money for highway renovation and maintenance.

"We get 18 percent of state money for schools, but we have just 12 percent of the kids. The Republicans created the School Reform Commission," Meehan said. "You could get nothing done for the City of Philadelphia without Republicans."

Changes in Philadelphia: *'the GOP... has to offer a big tent.'*

"This is a city that has changed since the 1980s. Maybe the Republicans haven't," said Ferrick of the *Inquirer*. "Right now having an 'R' next to your name is a liability here."

Kevin Kelly created a 35-page platform of reform for the city's GOP and circulated it among the party's leaders. In it Kelly reiterates he has no desire to blame individuals but rather find solutions, however it reads like an indictment of current party leadership, listing broad concerns like "Qualified and electable citizens will not run for office as a Republican," and more specific worries like "[Approximately] 10 wards currently have no Ward Leader." The platform includes suggestions like appointing an official spokesman and creating a policy committee.

"The lack of an overall strategy," Kelly writes, "combined with outdated tactics are the primary reasons for the past failure of the Philadelphia GOP."

While it comes in no direct missive, Kelly is calling for new leadership.

"It's way overdue," he said.

"The trouble in Philadelphia is that the folks who control things think it's not in the party's interest to compete," said Brett Mandel, the leader of the tax reform group. "There is no reason to put up good candidates. The alternative is true."

If the party is to develop, it seems clear they will need to attract one of the city's largest, least tested voting blocs: black Philadelphia, a diverse community of more than 448,000 residents at least 18-years-old. As our continued review of the city's four, broad voting groups have shown, the other three - Republicans, reform liberals and white ethnics - have been explored. Black voters, by wide and by large, have not.

"Really, it is the GOP that has to offer a big tent in local politics," said Myers, of the *Tribune*. "I think the African-American vote could be splintered. There are socially conservative, religious segments to the black voting bloc who could be won by the party's national platform and could be lured if city Republicans adequately portrayed themselves as possessors of change from their Democrat counterparts."

As promised earlier, it is important to note where Frank Rizzo failed in 1987 - an issue of a small tent. By Prof. Karen Kaufmann's analysis in *The Urban Voter*, a Republican in a Democratic city - like Rizzo in Philadelphia - should have benefited from the racial polarization of the city's first black mayor overseeing government during the MOVE debacle. But, Rizzo tied his candidacy to the two groups from our voting blocs that were declining the most in the 1980s: Republicans and white ethnics, or lunch-pail Democrats, his Rizzocrats.

Privileged communities of the far northwest and Center City still hold liberal progressives and North Philadelphia and West Philadelphia still hold large black communities. So, the lesson Rizzo learned then is one Republicans of today can learn.

What Philadelphia's population will be for the next census in 2010 is, of course, yet to be determined. By all accounts, cities in general and Philadelphia specifically seem to be turning a corner, but how quickly that corner can be turned is likewise unknown. Between the 2000 census and a 2006 projection that will be used for the count in 2010, Philadelphia still lost 60,000 people, nearly as many lost between 2000 and 1990 (U.S. Census).

Still, as early as 2006, a real estate report in the *New York Times* reported the end of urban decline in Center City.

Center City's population grew to 88,000 by the end of 2005 from 78,000 in 2000. Even more striking, the number of households rose by 24 percent, according to figures compiled by the Center City District, a business-improvement group (Chamberlain 2006).

Population booms traditionally grow out of a city's core. So, the first voting bloc to grow are the wealthier liberal progressives who can afford Center City condos - a population that ignored Rizzo is growing still. So, in different circumstances, Sam Katz in 2003 should have been better supported than in 1999, and certainly a better candidate than Frank Rizzo, whose two primary voting groups in 1987, as previously noted, were Republicans and his white-ethnic base, the two groups that are not yet returning to Philadelphia.

The black vote is too strong today for the Rizzo-style racial politics of the past. Though, as previously discussed, the city's Northwest Alliance is fractured, the black vote remains viable and connected enough to require Republicans to make modest gains if they will ever

succeed. A judgment needs to be made by the city's GOP on whether the Center City population boom is sufficient enough to racially polarize the electorate and win liberal progressives or whether the Republicans can win over enough black voters. As mentioned in discussing the 2003 election between Street and Katz, national politics can play an enormous role. In the political climate of the 2008 U.S. Presidential election, the Republican name remains tarnished, in both black and liberal progressive communities.

Further related lessons can be learned from that 2003 election. Despite a rematch between a black Democrat and a white Republican, race was not as overt an issue in their first campaign than the latter. During the election, Street was criticized for a 2002 speech to the NAACP during which, in noting its black mayor, black managing director, black fire commissioner, and black police commissioner, he gloated that "the brothers and sisters are running the city. We are in charge." Also, though Katz distanced himself and denied authorizing the mailing, he was criticized for "race baiting" after the Republican City Committee urged white voters to help Katz "take back Philly" (Kraus 2005).

Of course, the act helped alienate black voters and liberal progressives, more likely to identify with causes. Kaufmann's analysis would point to 1999 as a prime example of racializing heightening white voters identifying with a white candidate, but Street's past in Philadelphia politics and Katz's connections to the liberal progressive community could carry more weight. That is because the racial politics displayed in the 2003 Katz campaign - largely forgotten because of "the bug" - may increase turnout and support from lesser educated, working class whites - the ethnic Democrats from our voting groups - they, as noted above, motivate blacks and liberal progressives to rally against what can be perceived as bigotry.

So, while in national and some state campaigning, Republicans can benefit from a racialized electorate, like Rizzo in 1987, the Philadelphia Republican City Committee would only be attracting registered Republicans and white ethnics, the city's two smallest voting blocs. As Mayes, the *Tribune* reporter put it, city Republicans need to offer a big tent, finding commonality in issues - like business-first policy and budgetary discretion - rather than the racial politics and patronage that may have worked in the past and may work elsewhere today.

"A black [Republican] candidate, I think, would make things interesting," Ferrick said. "[New Democratic Mayor Michael] Nutter was derided as the white candidate. Did he get the black vote because he was black, because he was a Democrat, because he was always going to win, or because he was the best candidate for the job?"

No one, Ferrick included, can know for now.

How to win an election and build a party: *'If the Democrats get too fat, too happy.'*

The title of Kevin Kelly's platform is "Rebuilding a Majority," rebuilding a Republican power share that has been limping since the first Eisenhower administration. There is no avoiding the reality that the city's GOP needs to build its party.

"It starts at the lowest level, on school boards and neighborhood blocks," said Miller of St. Joseph's. "Republicans have not worked hard on the nitty gritty parts of local politics."

Look to the lessons of past narrow mayoral elections, as discussed above, Philadelphia Republicans must recognize that the largest single voting bloc from our four groups is, though diverse in its own right, the black voting bloc, also the most evasive for Republicans.

Nearly 10 percent of black adults are under some form of correctional supervision and thusly disenfranchised - a wildly disproportionate number considering just two percent of white adults are in the same situation (DOJ). Even accounting for a slightly higher rate among black Philadelphians, that still would leave more than 400,000 blacks of voting age.

If national elections are becoming increasingly candidate-driven, local parties need to adopt a stronger, clearer message or become an increasingly open tent for candidates who can attract different voting blocs.

Still, as Dave Glancey suggested, the Republicans could use a star. Athletes, like Tom Gola - the basketball star who became city controller as a Republican in the 1960s - gain notoriety without having to expend political capital. So, while Sam Katz is a household name in Philadelphia through failure, Gola did the same through victory. It does not matter in what venue those victories or failures came. Katz, although a worthy candidate by any and all accounts, has sufficiently burned his electioneering name campaigning with a fledgling party.

Other big names, like the city's Republican delegation to Harrisburg have never made inroads in Philadelphia beyond their Northeast communities. O'Brien, Perzel and Kenney - their relative power in the state capital aside - are not viable options because, to anyone beyond Holmesburg or Fox Chase, they are not Philadelphians.

Instead, since Philadelphia is particularly familiar with political machines, the Republicans could learn lessons from the Democrats of the 1950s.

"If the Democrats get too fat, too happy. If the demographics really changed, more affluent people kept moving into Center City. The more educated might not only vote for Democrats. New folks won't all vote 'D,'" said Mandel. That sounds eerily similar to the Republicans of post-World War II Philadelphia.

Mandel added: "You'd need a polarizing Democrat with a scandal"

So, improving fiscal promise for Philadelphia, which could attract more affluent and, perhaps eventually, middle-class families, might actually help Republicans - though they must be wary that the Democratic regime would be credited with ushering in a Philadelphia renaissance that may be growing. A city with populations beyond resistant blacks and progressive whites and a Democratic mayoral misstep - most often charges of corruption in Philadelphia - could be the opportunity.

It is important to remember that Joseph Clark's triumphant victory came not against Bernard Samuel, the well-liked Republican mayor who was suddenly ousted as the GOP candidate because of a change in the city charter. Clark beat an under prepared, less known contender. Incumbency was thrown out, so previous years of corruption allegations surfaced.

To the credit of the Democrats, though, they had been building for years. As discussed earlier, Clark became City Controller and Richardson Dilworth was elected City Treasurer in 1949. A year later, Dilworth ran unsuccessfully for governor, but his name recognition soared. They leveraged elections and waited for an opportunity. That opportunity came in 1951 when Samuel was ineligible to run and the Republicans replaced him with a machine candidate. The Democrats were ready. The Republicans of today are simply unprepared to benefit from Democratic failures or other such opportunities.

"Mayors, to be successful, they have to be lucky," said Miller. "One bad snowstorm, a crack in the pipes. Just look at the stuff under these streets. If they go, an entire administration might be ruined. Mayors can't really control the economy, they have no way to fight a national recession... What Republican is going to step in and take over for a disaster like that?"

Background: RESOURCES

References

- Balz, Dan and Matthew Mosk. "The year of the Black Republican." *Washington Post*. May 10, 2006
- (Calpri 1951). John C. Calpri. "Friendly Mayor' is proud of many projects." *Philadelphia Bulletin*. Dec. 23, 1951.
- (Chamberlain 2006). Lisa Chamberlain. "Tax Breaks Drive a Philadelphia Boom." *New York Times*. Jan. 8, 2006.
- (Clines 1999). Francis X. Clines. "Democrat wins in a squeaker election for mayor of Philadelphia." *New York Times*. Nov. 4, 1999
- (Committee of Seventy) The Committee of Seventy provides a database of election data. Extracted June 15, 2008. <<http://www.seventy.org/quick-links/past-elections/>>
- (CPI 1996). The Center for Public Integrity. "Arlen Specter." *The Buying of the President*. 1996. Extracted June 15, 2008. <<http://www.buyingofthepresident.org/index.php/archives/1996/53/>>
- (Croman 2008) John Croman. "Republican pastor to challenge Ellison in Congressional race." *KARE 11 News*. March 2008.
- (CTFP 2007). "Philadelphia Mayor Stret likely to endorse Clinton." *Chattanooga Times Free Press*. May 9, 2007.
- (DOJ). Department of Justice. Bureau of Justice Statistics. Extracted July 7, 2008. <<http://www.ojp.usdoj.gov/bjs/crimoff.htm>>
- (Dao 2003). James Dao and Howard Altman. " U.S. Bug in Mayor's Office Roils Philadelphia Race." *New York Times*. Oct. 9, 2003.
- (Dao 2005). James Dao. "G.O.P., Democrats in Its Sights, Is Grooming Black Candidates." *New York Times*. July 1, 2005.
- (Dingell). John D. Dingell biography. Extracted June 5, 2007. <<http://www.house.gov/dingell/bio.shtml>>
- (Dunn 2007). Mike Dunn. *KYW Newsradio*. Nov. 7, 2007.
- (Erie 1988). Steven P. Erie. *Rainbow's End: Irish-Americans and the Dilemmas of Urban Machine Politics, 1840-1985*. University of California Press. Berkeley. 1988
- (Fagone 2007). Jason Fagone. "Michael Nutter's Dilemma." *Philadelphia* magazine. January 2007.
- (Fish 1999). Larry Fish. "A tight race? city's been down this road before." *Philadelphia Inquirer*. Nov, 4 1999
- (Gelbert 2007a). "Phila. Republicans: An endangered species." *Philadelphia Inquirer*. Jan. 19, 2007
- (Gelbert 2007b). "Al Taubenberger: 'I've got nothing to lose.'" *Philadelphia Inquirer*. June 11, 2007
- (Gimpel 2004). James G. Gimpel and Jason E. Schuknect. *Patchwork Nation*. University of Michigan Press. 2004
- (Gregory 2006). Kia Gregory. "North by Northwest." *Philadelphia Weekly*. March 1, 2006.
- (Home Rule Charter) See online at <<http://www.phila.gov/personnel/homerule/index.htm>>
- (Huber 2006). Robert Huber and Benjamin Wallace. *The Philadelphia Reader*. Temple University Press. 2006.
- (Infield 1998). Tom Infield. "City Republicans pin hopes on Sam Katz." *Philadelphia Inquirer*.

Dec. 8, 1998.
(Infield 1999). Tom Infield. "A GOP stake in a Street win." *Philadelphia Inquirer*. May 19, 1999.
(Jalonick 2002). Mary Clare Jalonick. "Bret Schundler's Big Win." Campaigns & Elections. 2002. Extracted June 15, 2008 <<http://www.bretschundler.org/campaignsandelections0801.shtml>>
(Kaufmann 2004). Karen M. Kaufmann. *The Urban Voter*. University of Michigan Press. 2004.
(Kerkstra 2007). Patrick Kerkstra. "Progressives a-blog about Nutter-Brady." *Philadelphia Inquirer*. Heard in the Hall. Dec. 10, 2007.
(KIP 2004). Knowledge Industry Partnership. "Knowledge Industry Partnership Releases Results of Survey of Recent College Graduates." KIPOnline.org. June 11, 2004.
(Kostelni 2003). Natalie Kostelni and Larry Rulison. "Carpenters union to back Katz for mayor." *Philadelphia Business Journal*. Sept. 16, 2003.
(Kranish 2007). Michael Kranish. "4 GOP candidates' decision to skip black forum seen hurting party in '08." Boston Globe. Sept. 19, 2007.
(Kraus 2005). Jeffrey Kraus. A Tale of Two Cities Revisited. Pennsylvania Legislative. 2005.
(Longstreth 1990). Thatcher Longstreth and Dan Rottenberg. *Main Line WSP*. W.W. Norton. 1990.
(Lopez 1995). Steve Lopez. *Land of Giants*. Camino Books Inc. 1995
(Lucey 2007). Catherine Lucey. "Starting today, he's in the race." *Philadelphia daily News*. Jan. 25 2007.
(Mayoral Election Totals). See online at <<http://www.phila.gov/PHILS/Mayor1st.htm>>
(McCaffery 1993). Peter McCaffery. *When Bosses Ruled Philadelphia: The Emergency of the Republican Machine, 1867-1933*. 1993. The Pennsylvania State University Press. University Park.
(McWhorter 2006) John McWhorter. "Letter to the GOP." *The New York Sun*. Nov. 16, 2006.
(Mikell 2007) E-mail correspondence with Dr. Ray S. Mikell. University of New Orleans. May 25, 2007. See below.
(Mishak 2004). Michael J. Mishak. "City's top political watchdog to step down." *Chestnut Hill Local*. Dec. 16, 2004.
(Namako 2007). Tom Namako. "What about AI?" *Philadelphia City Paper*. May 16, 2007.
(New York Times 1992). *New York Times*. "Jersey City's mayor-elect gets ready to battle anew." *New York Times*. Nov. 5, 1992.
(Passarella 2006). Gina Passarella. "Philadelphia Republican Party GC moving to Wolf Block." *The Legal Intelligencier*. Jan. 26, 2006.
(PBJ 2003). *Philadelphia Business Journal*. "AFSCME union endorses Katz." *Philadelphia Business Journal*. Oct. 15, 2003.
(Philadelphia Historic Census) See attached.
(Quinnipiac 2006). Quinnipiac University. "Rendell Leads Swann By 10 Points In Gov Race." April 5, 2006.
(Reichley 1959). James Reichley. *The Art of Government: Reform and Organization Politics in Philadelphia*. 1959. The Fund for the Republic, Inc. New York
(SFRP) San Francisco Republican Party Web site. Extracted June 15, 2008. <<http://www.sfgop.com>>
(Shaheeli 2007). Joe Shaheeli. "Is GOP heading for a Civil War?: Meehan faces house revolt." *Philadelphia Public Record*. July 26, 2007.
(Stevens 1987). William K. Stevens. "Turnout seen as key in Philadelphia mayoral vote." *New York Times*. Nov. 2, 1987.
(Walters 2007). Patrick Walters. "Weak Party-building behind Philly GOP." *Associated Press*. Feb. 23, 2007.
(Warner 2008). Bob Warner. "Red lights mean green for GOP." *Philadelphia Daily News*. March 18, 2008.
(WHYY 2007). The Next Mayor. Citywide Election Results. Extracted March 9, 2008.

<http://www.thenextmayor.com/nov_results/results.html>
(Zausner 1999). Robert Zausner. "Katz team takes in, spends thousands." *Philadelphia Inquirer*. June 9, 1999.

Interview Subjects and Special Thanks

Dave Davies: *senior writer on government and politics since 1990 for the Philadelphia Daily News.*

Richard Dilworth: *assistant professor of history and politics at Drexel University.*

Tom Ferrick: *former political writer and metro columnist for the Philadelphia Inquirer.*

David B. Glancey: *former head of the city's Democratic Party and retired CEO of the Board of Revision of Taxes*

Phil Goldsmith: *former managing director and former deputy mayor of the City of Philadelphia*

Ellen Kaplan: *former issues director for Katz for Mayor 1999 and policy director of the Committee of Seventy*

Sam Katz: *three-time Republican candidate for Philadelphia mayor*

Karen Kaufmann: *associate professor of government and politics at the University of Maryland*

Kevin Kelly: *former president of Young Republicans of Philadelphia and city GOP reform activist*

Brett Mandel: *executive director of Philadelphia Forward*

Eric Mayes: *political writer for the Philadelphia Tribune.*

Michael Meehan: *general counsel for the Philadelphia Republican City Committee*

Dr. Ray S. Mikell: *assistant professor of political science at the University of New Orleans*

Dr. Randall Miller: *professor of history at St. Joseph's University*

David Pendered: *city hall reporter at the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (Correspondence not used)*

John Street: *Mayor of the City of Philadelphia, 2000-2008*

Jim Tharpe: *metro reporter at the Atlanta Journal-Constitution (Correspondence not used)*

Fred Voigt: *former executive director of the Committee of Seventy*

CHART

Registered Republicans - 147,000

D Registrations in overwhelming black districts -

D Registrations in Hill and University City districts -

D Registrations in whiter South Philly/Northeast